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MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
it by the Minnesota court. State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash73 indi-
cates that federal standards74 governing habeas corpus pro-
ceedings will receive paramount consideration in post-conviction
cases coming before the Minnesota court.75 If the court takes
this approach, a long stride will have been taken toward a single
system of criminal justice for federal review will rarely disturb
its adjudication under the Post Conviction Remedy.
Statutes: An Extension of Long-Arm Jurisdiction
The 1967 Minnesota legislature enacted a long-arm statute'
ing. Thus, it would seem that the draftsmen might have provided that
the court could summarily deny a petition based on any previously
adjudicated grounds.
73. 152 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1967).
74. The federal standards are set out in note 16 supra.
75. See note 10 supra.
1. Subd. 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts
enumerated in this subdivision, a court of this state with juris-
diction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any foreign corporation or any non-resident individual, or
his personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a
domestic corporation or he were a resident of this state. This
section applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign
corporation or non-resident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property
situated in this state, or(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any tort in Minnesota causing injury or prop-
erty damage, or
(d) Commits any tort outside of Minnesota causing injury
or property damage within Minnesota, if, (1) at the
time of the injury, solicitation or service activities were
carried on within Minnesota by or on behalf of the
defendant, or (2) products, materials or things proc-
essed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were
used or consumed within Minnesota in the ordinary
course of trade.
Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is sub-ject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in
this section, may be made by personally serving the summons
upon the defendant outside this state with the same effect as
though the summons had been personally served within this
state.
Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts enumer-
ated in subdivision 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an
action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in this section shall limit or
affect the right to serve any process in any other manner now
or hereafter provided by law or the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Subd. 5. Non-resident individual, as used in this section,
means any individual, or his personal representative, who is
not domiciled or residing in the state when suit is commenced.
MftNN. STAT. § 543.19 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as the Long-Arm
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authorizing in personam jurisdiction over nonresident individu-
als and corporations in causes of action arising out of the owner-
ship of realty or personalty situated within Minnesota, the trans-
action of business within Minnesota, the commission of a tort in
Minnesota, or the commission of a tort outside the state with
injury resulting within.2 Intended to supplement rather than
replace prior jurisdictional and service of process statutes, the
statute significantly extends the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts
and is available to both nonresident and resident plaintiffs.
International Shoe Company v. Washington3 provided the
impetus to the enactment of long-arm statutes by liberalizing
the constitutional due process standard which limits the right
of a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident. The Inter-
national Shoe standard requires "certain minimum contacts ...
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 4 The basic
consideration is whether it is reasonable to subject the defendant
to suit in the particular jurisdictior.. 5 The Long-Arm Statute
Statute]. This is not to be confused with M__m. STAT. § 303.13
(Supp. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Statute] which
provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation that "makes a
contract with a resident of Minnesota to be performed in whole or
in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation
commits a tort in whole or in part in N[innesota against a resident of
Minnesota ......
2. Several other states have long-arm statutes incorporating all
or part of these provisions in varying forms. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
AxN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1967); ILL. REv. ST:AT. ch. 110, § 17 (1965); ME.
RSv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704 (1965); :1Ic. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.705,
.712, .725, .735 (Callaghan ed. 1962); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953); TENN.
CODE AN. § 20-220 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958); WAsH.
REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1962); Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (1965).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In this case, the Court upheld state
court jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant even though
the corporation's only contacts with the state had been some eleven to
thirteen salesmen operating on commission who transmitted orders to
the central office located in another state.
4. Id. at 316. Prior to International Shoe the traditional due proc-
ess test of state jurisdictional power required the physical presence of
the defendant within the forum state. ]?ennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877); Sellars v. Sellars, 196 Minn. 143, 264 N.W. 425 (1936).
For a discussion of the expansive effects of International Shoe, see
generally 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 179 (Wright ed. 1960); 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 4.25 (3), (4);
Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42
MNN. L. REv. 909 (1958); Note, The Growth of the International Shoe
Doctrine, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 523 (1949).
5. 326 U.S. at 317; see Note, Developments in the Law: State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 919-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
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takes advantage of these less stringent due process requirements
to legislatively expand the jurisdictional power of the state court
over nonresidents.(
Subdivision 1(a) of the statute subjects a nonresident to the
jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts if he "owns, uses, or pos-
sesses any real or personal property situated in the state." This
provision is similar to quasi in rem jurisdiction in that both are
based on ownership of property. However, in quasi in rem juris-
diction the cause of action need not be related to the property,
although the recovery allowed is limited by the value of the
property.7 Under the Long-Arm Statute the jurisdiction must
arise out of the relationship to the property, but since it is in
personam jurisdiction there is no arbitrary limit on either the
type of action that may be brought or the amount that can be
recovered.
Since ownership, use, or possession is the basis for jurisdic-
tion under this provision of the statute, the relationship be-
tween the nonresident and the property located within the state
must satisfy due process as well as traditional property law
standards. Because property law definitions can encompass sit-
uations of varied significance, s ownership in the context of the
rights to an article or a parcel of land may not be equivalent
to the type of ownership required in the jurisdictional due proc-
ess context. Consequently, the past treatment of ownership
6. For a general examination of the constitutionality of the stat-
utes which have resulted from the International Shoe doctrine, see
generally Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599 (1955); Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction:
Some Current Problems and Modem Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 198
(1958); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Bases on Local Causes of Action,
1956 Wis. L. REV. 522; O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State
Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act,
31 NoTrE DAm LAW. 223 (1955).
7. E.g., Rosenblet v. Pere Marquette Ry., 162 Minn. 55, 202 N.W.
56 (1925); Wagner v. Farmers Co-operative Exch. Co., 147 Minn. 376,
180 N.W. 231 (1920). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877);
Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 A. 280 (1923). How-
ever, the amendments to MAmw. R. Cirv. P. 4.04, effective Feb. 1, 1968,
would make a judgment valid as to the amount of the claim rather
than limit it to the value of the property upon which jurisdiction is
based unless a default judgment is entered.
8. Compare Reed v. Horton, 135 Minn. 17, 159 N.W. 1080 (1916)
("owner" includes a conditional vendee and a mortgagor), with Atwater
v. Spalding, 86 Minn. 101, 90 N.W. 370 (1902) ("owner" is person in
whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property), and
Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 26 N.W. 725 (1886) (ownership is any
interest which may be sold); see Beck v. Council of the City of St.
Paul, 235 Minn. 56, 50 N.W.2d 81 (1951).
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
concepts in Minnesota may be of limited assistance in arriving
at guidelines for applying this section of the statute. There are,
however, several statutes in other states with analogous provi-
sions that have been upheld constitutionally.9 One of these,
the Pennsylvania statute,10 has been interpreted to mean that a
nonresident trustee who administers real property in the state
is an "owner;" 1 that an excavator who causes damage to adja-
cent land is a "user" of the damaged land; 2 and that a nonresi-
dent mortgagee who collects rents from outside the state after
default of the mortgagor is also a "user.'1 3 Thus it would appear
that one important factor in determining ownership is monetary
benefit, either derived from or incident to the relationship with
the property.
The application of this section of the statute may be further
complicated by its failure to distinguish between jurisdiction
derived from real property and that resulting from personal
property. Realty is permanently within the jurisdiction of the
court, has inherent income producing capabilities, and is usually
of significant value.' 4 These characteristics insure that in most
instances the owner, user, or possessor will have substantial con-
tact with the forum state.15 The nature of personalty, on the
other hand, is that it is perishable, can be readily moved out of
the state's control, and can be of minimal value. 16 More im-
portantly, its presence in a state may be completely fortuitous
as far as the actual owner is concerned, as in situations involv-
ing stolen property, the conditional sales contract, and the chat-
tel mortgage.'7  In each of these instances the title holder or
9. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (c) (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 704(c) (1965); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE§ 4.28.185(1) (c) (1962).
10. The Pennsylvania long-arm statute applies only to realty.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953); see Note, Ownership, Possession,
or Use of Property as a Basis of In Personam. Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L.
REV. 374, 378-81 (1959) (discussion of the Pennsylvania statute).
11. Jamison v. United Cigar Whelan Stores, 68 Pa. D. & C. 121
(Phila. County Ct. 1949).
12. Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D. & C. 557 (Phila. County Ct. 1954).
13. Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phila. County Ct.
1938).
14. See Note, Ownership, Possession, or Use of Property as a Basis
of In Personam Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 374, 382 (1959).
15. See id. at 375 (ownership of realty fits the concept of "doing
business" more readily than it fits the single act theory).
16. See id. at 382; Developments 947-48.
17. A provision allowing for jurisdiction based on ownership of per-
sonal property was specifically excluded from the UNIromvI INTERSTATE
[Vol. 52:698
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owner is technically within the statute's provisions, but is likely
to have had little or no control over the whereabouts or the
use of the personalty.18
One case' 9 suggests that the courts will not sustain jurisdic-
tion based on such technical grounds. However, that case sus-
tained jurisdiction on the basis of the transaction of business
within the state. The argument had been made that jurisdiction
was also available due to the retention of title by the manu-
facturer pursuant to a conditional sales contract, but the court
indicated that, standing alone, this might not satisfy the juris-
dictional requirement of ownership of tangible personalty within
the state.20 This discussion indicates that technical compliance
with the provisions of the statute may not be sufficient to meet
the International Shoe due process requirement. If ownership,
use, or possession is tenuous, additional contacts with the state
may be necessary.
Subdivision 1(b) of the statute provides in personam juris-
diction over a nonresident individual or corporation who "trans-
acts any business within the state" for causes of action arising
out of such transactions. The determination of what shall consti-
tute the transaction of business must, of course, be compatible
with the due process standard established in International Shoe.21
It cannot mean any transaction, regardless of how insignificant
or fortuitous, since International Shoe indicated that the "nature
and quality and the circumstances" '22 of the act are significant,
and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company 3 added
that jurisdiction must be based on "substantial connection"
with the state.2 4 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court will
AND INTERNATIONAL PROcEDuRE ACT in order to avoid the anticipated
difficulties that might arise from these three situations. Commissioner's
Note, UNIFORMi INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03,
9B UNIFOmv LAWS ANN. 313 (1966).
18. Even if these considerations were to ultimately provide a de-
fense to the action, the statute could be used as an instrument of
harassment by forcing a nonresident who is technically within its pur-
view to sustain the inconvenience and expense of establishing such
defense in the forum state. Cf. Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C.
61 (Phila. County Ct. 1938).
19. Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
20. Id. at 994, 385 P.2d at 309. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84.A, comment (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
21. Idaho has attempted to spell out in detail the sort of transac-
tions it believes to be a basis for jurisdiction. See IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 5-514(a) (Supp. 1967).
22. 326 U.S. at 318.
23. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
24. Id. at 223. See Trippe Mg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d
1968]
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probably interpret the phrase as liberally as is consistent with
due process, since it has expressed its approval of the trend
toward liberality in state court jurisdiction. 25
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the Cor-
porate Statute phrase, "contract . . . to be performed in whole
or in part ... in Minnesota," 26 is also relevant to the Long-Arm
Statute since the two statutes, in this context, are similar in pur-
pose and language2 7 Since the Long-Arm Statute cannot alter
the basic due process standards, it would seem that interpreta-
tion of the phrase "transacts any business," although it incor-
porates more acts than the more restrictive Corporate Statute,
will be based upon the general principles which evolved there-
under. Under the Corporate Statute, the court has noted that
an examination of the "quality and nature of the transaction
rather than . . . the quantity of business done" is necessary.28
Furthermore, in Dahlberg Company v. Western Hearing Aid
Center, Limited29 the court held that it had jurisdiction because
the "defendants ... enjoyed the benefits of the laws of this state
and. . . had access to our courts to enforce any rights in regard
to the transactions involved. ' 30 But in Fourth Northwestern
National Bank v. Hilson Industries, Ir.c.,31 where the only contact
between the nonresident buyer and the state was the initial
solicitation and the place of payment, the court denied juris-
diction since there were no acts of significance within the state
that would enable the defendant to enjoy the benefits of Minne-
sota law. It is significant that in Hilson part performance was
821 (7th Cir. 1959). But see Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc.,
240 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1965); Note, Due Process and Foreign Cor-
porations-The Minnesota Single Act Statute, 50 Mnn. L. REv. 946,
959-60 (1966).
25. See Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 553, 99 N.W.2d 670, 677
(1959). This clause is very similar to § 1.03 of the UNIFORM INTER-
STATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, which the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws stated should be given expansive interpretation. Com-
missioner's Note, UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT § 1.02, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 310-11 (1966).
26. MINN. STAT. § 303.12(1) (3) (Supp. 1966).
27. It is true that a literal reading of the two statutes does not
reveal complete harmony. The Corporate Statute requires part per-
formance within the state while the Long-Arm Statute includes a situa-
tion with all contract negotiations within the state, but with perform-
ance by both parties without. The more normal business transaction,
however, would include some elements of performance within the
state, thus falling within both statutes.
28. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 552, 99 N.W.2d 670, 677 (1959).
29. 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961).
30. Id. at 337, 107 N.W.2d at 385.
31. 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
[Vol. 52:698
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to take place within Minnesota, thus satisfying the literal terms
of the Corporate Statute. Jurisdiction was denied, however,
since the contacts were insufficient to satisfy due process. 32
Under the Long-Arm Statute, the court should continue to
examine the quality and nature of the contacts and the defend-
ant's enjoyment of, or opportunity to enjoy, the benefits of the
laws and courts of the state. In addition, assistance may be
obtained from foreign cases interpreting statutory provisions with
similar language.33 Furthermore, both Dahlberg and Hilson rec-
ognize that the overall reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdic-
tion "may be tested by the standards analogous to those of forum
non conveniens. ' '34 The relevant considerations under this
doctrine are "the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; pos-
sibility of view of premises . . . ," and the enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained.3 5 Of course, the courts should also
be receptive to a dismissal motion based on forum non con-
veniens" where, despite compliance with both the statute and
32. Id. at 118, 117 N.W.2d at 736. Both Dahlberg and Hilson in-
volved nonresident buyers entering into agreements with Minnesota
sellers; it is evident that the Minnesota court will be more hesitant to
impose jurisdiction when the nonresident is a buyer rather than a seller.
See Note, Due Process and Foreign Corporations-The Minnesota Single
Act Statute, 50 MiNx. L. REV. 946, 953 n.34 (1966). This situation ap-
peared in Marshall Egg Trans. Co. v. Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534,
148 N.W.2d 161 (1967), where the court refused jurisdiction, citing Hilson.
It is not clear, however, whether the decision was based on due process
grounds or a policy of avoiding the discouragement of nonresident
buyers from doing business in Minnesota. The decision has been criti-
cized for failing to clearly distinguish the two approaches. Comment,
52 Mimx. L. REv. 723 (1968).
33. See, e.g., National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270
F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960); Magnaflux
Corp. v. Foerster, D.C., 223 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Kropp Forge
Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962); Grobark v.
Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959); Berlemarm v.
Superior Distrib. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958). Illi-
nois was one of the first jurisdictions to use the "transaction of busi-
ness" language. For a thorough discussion of the background and appli-
cation of the Illinois statute, see Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice
Notes, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 17, at 165 (1955); id. at 22 (Supp. 1966).
34. Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264
Minn. 110, 119, 117 N.W.2d 732, 737 (1962); Dahlberg Co. v. Western
Hearing Aid Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 335, 107 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1961).
35. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). See Note,
Due Process and Foreign Corporations-The Minnesota Single Act Stat-
ute, 50 Mnm'. L. REv. 946, 953-54 (1966); Developments 1011-13.
36. This policy was adopted by Minnesota in Johnson v. Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954). See also Hill v.
1968]
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due process, Minnesota is not the proper place for trial.37
Subdivision 1 (c) provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident
who "commits any tort in Minnesota causing injury or property
damage" while subdivision 1(d) subjects a nonresident to Minne-
sota jurisdiction if he "commits any tort outside of Minnesota
causing injury or property damage within Minnesota. . . ." Sub-
division 1(c) encompasses an act and an injury, both occurring
within the state,38 or an act occurring within the state with re-
sultant injury without. 39 In the case of a tort committed without
the state and injury within, subdivision 1(d) further requires
that either "(1) . . . solicitation or service activities [be] carried
on within Minnesota by or on behalf of the defendant, or (2)
products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufac-
tured by the defendant [be] used or consumed within Minnesota
in the ordinary course of trade" at the time of the injury.
This latter section is a legislative recognition that injury alone
is not a sufficient "minimum contact" to confer jurisdiction.
However, the additional contacts which are necessary when the
tort occurs outside the state are not required by the statute to
be related to the actual injury. Furthermore, courts sustaining
jurisdiction under similar statutes have often been satisfied by
Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d 654 (1958);
Ramsey v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 247 Minn. 217, 77 N.W.2d 176 (1956).
The policy, initially formulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), allows a court to refuse to accept juris-
diction although jurisdiction has been properly authorized by the legis-
lature, if it is an inappropriate forum for trial. Id. at 507.
37. Although forum non conveniens is available where a resident
plaintiff is attempting to use the court's jurisdiction, Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), it would seem that where both plain-
tiff and defendant are nonresidents and jurisdiction is obtained under
the Long-Arm Statute, the Minnesota courts should be especially alert,
not only to the possibility of harrassment, but also to the opportun-
ity to relieve the state from the time and expense involved in handling
nonresident litigation.
38. The constitutionality of statutes basing jurisdiction on the com-
mission of a tortious act, or a tort in part within the state, has been
uniformly sustained. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673 (1957); Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957);
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
(1951); Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249 (1959). Cf. Ehlers
v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d
824 (1963) (product manufactured outside state causing injury within).
39. Wisconsin's long-arm statute so provides expressly. Even under
the more general language of the Minnesota Act, so long as the cir-
cumstances attendant to an act in the state with resulting injury
without satisfying the various aspects of the International Shoe due
process test, jurisdiction should be available.
[Vol. 52:698
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contacts with the state that were not related to the particular
action.40
Since the Corporate Statute allows jurisdiction over tort ac-
tions against nonresidents arising out of acts committed without
the state if injury occurred within, the additional contacts re-
quired by the Long-Arm Statute might appear to be a contraction
of the jurisdictional reach over noncorporate defendants. An ex-
amination of the case law under the Corporate Statute, however,
indicates that the courts have looked at the entire transaction
more closely than the statute demanded in order to decide the
due process question. In all cases there has been some contact 4'
with the state beyond the injury, such as a fifty-year history of
sales of the defendant's product,42 solicitation for sale of de-
fendant's product,43 or use of the defendant's product within
the state in the ordinary course of trade. 44 Jurisdiction based
on a single act "without more" 45 contact 46 has also been refused.
Thus, it would appear that the Minnesota legislature has done
little more than codify the circumstances under which Minne-
sota courts have sustained jurisdiction in nonresident tort cases
in the past. It follows that the cases decided under the Cor-
porate Statute will have continuing validity as precedent in ap-
plying the new legislation.
Due to its focus on the more common products liability situa-
40. See cases cited in Commissioner's Note, UNIFORm INTERSTATE
AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03, 9B UNIFORm LAWS ANN.
312. Subdivision 1 (d) is identical to a section of the Wisconsin general
jurisdiction statute, Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4) (Supp. 1967), which has
been said to require two jurisdictional contacts: (1) the occurrence in
the state of the injury which the defendant is claimed to have caused,
and (2) some additional contact not necessarily related to that injury.
Foster, Revision Notes, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05, at 30 (Supp. 1967).
41. The Long-Arm Statute provides that the activities may either
be carried on "by or on behalf of the defendant." This phrase appears
to preclude any argument that solicitation or service activities by such
persons as franchisers, independent salesmen, or independent contractors
hired to service products are not those of the manufacturer.
42. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 575, 104
N.W.2d 888, 891 (1960).
43. Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 55, 108 N.W.2d
607, 607-08 (1961).
44. Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn.
56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963).
45. Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524, 527
(D. Minn. 1961).
46. Id.; Carlson v. Chatfield Mach. Co., 228 F. Supp. 162 (D. Minn.
1964); Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876
(D. Minn. 1960); cf. Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1965).
19681
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tions, this provision of the new statute does not cover all cases
where jurisdiction should be authorized when a single act with-
out the state causes injury within.47 Nonetheless, it does en-
compass the most common situations and, in that respect, pro-
vides a relatively concise standard for jurisdiction for most
cases.
48
Subdivision 2 of the new statute provides that personal serv-
ice of process on the nonresident outside Minnesota will have
the same effect as though service had been made within the
state.49 The purpose of this provision is to provide the plaintiff
with an authorized type of service that is most likely to lead to
actual notice,50 and personal service is the best method for giv-
ing such assurance.5' Although the new statute does not spe-
cify the manner in which personal service is to be made, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended "personal
service" to mean that defined in the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure.5 2  The statute states, however, only that personal
47. The Long-Arm Statute, in effect, supersedes the Corporate
Statute in most instances. However, one situation can be posed that
probably would not fall within the Long-Arm Statute but which might
be covered by the Corporate Statute. Assume that an Illinois corpora-
tion's plane, while flying over Wisconsin crashes into a Wisconsin dam,
resulting in the flooding of property in Minnesota. Jurisdiction in an
action for recovery of the damages to the Minnesota land would not be
available under the Long-Arm Statute if there had been no other ac-
tivities in the state. Under the Corporate Statute, however, the damage
would be considered a tort committed in part within the state, thus
technically conferring jurisdiction. The question still remains whether
a court would agree that the injury alone was sufficient to meet due
process requirements. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
48. One court has delineated the following factors which must be
considered from a review of the applicable Supreme Court decisions:
"quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of the contacts, ...
the source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts,
... the interest of the forum state and convenience. . . ." Aftanase v.
Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965). These factors
have been approved and applied in Bonhiver v. Louisiana Brokers Exch.,
Inc., 255 F. Supp. 254 (D. Minn. 1966), and McDermott v. Bremson, 273
Minn. 104, 139 N.W.2d 809 (1966).
49. In the past, personal service of process on nonresidents has
been authorized by MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.04. However, the effect of such
service is the same as that of substituted service. Substituted service
is limited in that the defendant, if he does not receive actual notice,
"may be permitted to defend at any time within one year afterjudgment, on such terms as may be just." Mmx. R. Civ. P. 4.043. The
new statute provides the defendant with no such opportunity.
50. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712
(1940).
51. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
52. Mhmw. R. Civ. P. 4.03 provides that personal service upon an
individual can be made by "delivering a copy to him personally or by
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service outside the state may be made, not that it is the only
method allowable. This indicates that any method meeting con-
stitutional due process requirements and authorized by the Min-
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure would also be valid. The effect
of these other methods, however, would be that of substituted
service, not personal service within the state.53
Subdivision 3 limits the causes of action in a suit in which
jurisdiction is based on this statute to those arising from acts
enumerated in subdivision 1. This allows the defendant to con-
test an action based on the statute without becoming exposed to
suit on unrelated claims. Subdivision 4 provides that the stat-
ute shall in no way affect the right to serve process in any of
the methods heretofore authorized by the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure or by statute, nor shall it affect this right as to
any future laws or amendments. This, in conjunction with sub-
division 2, indicates that only constitutional due process require-
ments will limit the method of service.
Subdivision 5 is intended to prevent the jurisdictional gap
that could occur if the statute directed itself to a person who
was a nonresident at the time that the cause of action arose. In
such a case the defendant could leave the state after performing
the act upon which jurisdiction would be based and claim im-
munity to process under the long-arm statute.5 4 Therefore, the
statute declares that the nonresident, or his personal representa-
tive,65 is a person "not domiciled or residing in the state when
suit is commenced."
The overall effect of the Long-Arm Statute is to increase the
availability of the Minnesota courts to plaintiffs with claims
against nonresident individuals and corporations, particularly
as to claims resulting from property within the state owned by
nonresidents. The frequently limited satisfaction available from
quasi in rem jurisdiction can now be replaced in most instances
leaving a copy at his usual place of abode with some person of suit-
able age and discretion then residing therein."
53. MINN. R. Crv. P. 4.04, 4.043.
54. This argument was rejected in O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d
1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
55. In a legal context "personal representative" commonly means
"executor" or "administrator." Jones v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 108
Minn. 129, 121 N.W. 606 (1909); Lowry v. Duluth, 94 Minn. 95, 101 N.W.
1069 (1905); BALLENTNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (2d ed. 1948); WEBsTER's
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1687 (3d ed. 1965). But the Minne-
sota Nonresident Motorist Statute, MINN. STAT. § 170.55 (1961), refers
to "executor, administrator, or personal representative," indicating that
in at least that context the legislature intends personal representative to
mean more than just executor or administrator.
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